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COMMENTS
from any right therein might lead to his unwillingness to disclose his discovery.
To avoid this, the owner of the locus in quo should be given the custody of the
goods for a period determined by statute, after which he and the finder should
share in the goods equitably.
Whether the distinction between lost and mislaid goods should be maintained
is a serious question. From the practical difficulties arising in determining, in
a specific case, into which of these categories a particular object falls, a negative
answer is supportable. Then too, the possibility of a mislaid article slipping
to the floor and becoming lost also argues against this distinction. But if the
itinerant finder of goods, mislaid in a quasi-public place, is to be given the
right to possession, rather than the owner of the locus in quo, the distinction
should be maintained. For then the owner of the locus in quo, who is more
likely to protect the interests of the owner, would retain possession under the
established rules of mislaid property. It is submitted that, unless the receptacle
theory is followed, the distinction between lost and mislaid property should be
maintained but modified to give both the finder and the owner of the locus in
quo equitable protection where the owner of the chattel does not ultimately
claim the property.
INJUNCTION VERSUS INDICTMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In the formative years of the English common law,' there were many gaps
in the remedies necessary for a complete code of justice. These gaps were
caused by the rigid adherence of the common law judges to precedents to the
extent that in many instances even if the precedent were clearly wrong, it
was followed.2 Such an inflexible conservatism perpetuated error and unjust
law. Litigants were forced to appeal to the king who in turn referred them
to his chancellor,3 the "keeper of his conscience." The chancellor was in-
variably a clergyman, and a student of Roman and Canon law.4 When he
1. To properly evaluate the nature of the problem involved, the history of equity
in general is a necessary adjunct. Cf. 1 SToRy, Comsrz,=mrs o. Env=n JunLsrnuDE:.cn
(13th ed. 1886) 51.
2. 1 POaEROy, EQu='r JuPmPauDxcE (4th ed. 1918) § 16. This rigidity prevented
the English common law from developing along the line of natural justice as did the law
in ancient Rome. The Roman law was aided in its development toward natural jusice
because of the willingness of the praetors to administer both law and equity. In England,
however, the common law judges were not disposed to so adapt themslves. This situ-
ation necessitated the establishment of the two rival systems of common law and equity.
1 HoniswopTH, HisoRY or ENGLISH LAw (3d ed. 1922) 449. When Lord fansfield
attempted to emulate the Roman practors, he was accused of being ignorant of the
English law. 1 Poaixnoir, op. cit. supra § 18; cf. 1 Hornswon=, op. cit. supra at 77, 73.
3. 1 HoLnswoaRT, op, cit. supra note 2, at 449.
4. 5 HoL.DswoRas, op. it. supra note 2, at 218.
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decided the cases it was in accordance with the doctrines of aequitas prevalent
in those systems of jurisprudence.5 In this manner, a code of justice was
formed to complement the law.6 The theory was that wherever the remedy
at law was inadequate, recourse was had to equity for relief.7
At first, this jurisdiction of equity was ill-defined and the common law
was not considered to be a separate and distinct system of law.8 And so, it
happened that the chancellor did not confine his jurisdiction to the civil law.
Jurisdiction was assumed over cases of criminal nature. There were two
reasons for this extension of equity to the penal branch of the law. The first
was that the local magistrates at the time of Richard II were easily impressed
by wealthy landowners.9 A penurious plaintiff did not receive justice against
an affluent defendant. The second cause of the extension of equity into
criminal matters was the widespread lawlessness and the rampant violence
prevalent throughout the country. 10 But it must be noted that this juris-
5. 5 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 216; cf. PoLLocK, ESSAYS IN T11E LAw
(1922) 40. The law of nature as declared by the Romans is similar to the law of God
as declared by the clergy in the Canon law.
There were several factors operating to prevent the development of the English common
law into a system of jurisprudence similar to the concepts of right, duty, and morality
as they existed in the Roman code. The inflexibility of the common law was one. See
note 2, supra. Secondly the feudal laws of property found no counterpart in the law
of Rome. 1 POMEROY, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 18. Thirdly, after the Reformation, the
animosity of the Crown for the Church of Rome was wreaked upon everything Roman.
The law of Rome, too, became obnoxious because of its name and its support by the
Pope. It fell into disfavor and was rarely cited in the common law courts. Id. § 12;
cf. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Reprints 107 (1704) (common law
judge basing the entire doctrine of bailments on the Roman concept); 2 HoLDswoaT1,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 289.
6. There were many reasons besides the failure of attainment of justice in the commort
law courts for the trend of litigants to equity. A major shortcoming of the common law
was the fixed number of the forms of action. If a cause of action didn't fit the limited
number of writs, there was no remedy at law and relief was had in equity. 1 PoaratoY,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 21. Another reason was the inability of the law courts to com-
mand an act to be done by the parties. MATLAND, EQum= (2d ed. rev. 1936) 5. An
advantage of a trial in equity was that its flexibility enabled it to deal with more than
a two-sided case. EATON, EQurr (2d ed. 1923) 14. Another advantage of equity
procedure was that the future commission of harm could be enjoined. CLARK, EQUITY
(1937) § 5.
7. 1 Po .Roy, op. cit. supra note 2, § 217; EATON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 8.
8. MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 6, at 5; EATON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 5. It was
not until the fourteenth century that a clear distinction was made between equity and
common law. Adams, The Origin of English Equity (1916) 16 CoL. L. REv. 87. As an
example of the lack of any definite boundary, the kings justices for a time believed that
they could do whatever equity could do. 1 PorLoCi AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENosIx
LAW (2d ed. 1923) 197.
9. EATON, op. cit. siipra note 6, at 15.
10. Mack, Revival of Criminal Equdty (1903) 16 HARv. L. REV. 389, 390, 391;
Comment (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 440.
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diction was considered as temporary. 1 The chancellors were merely aiding
the courts of law until such time as the common law judges were able to
judiciously handle the cases. After the Tudor period, the condition of the
country was altered. Equity became clearly defined as a court of civil
remedies complementary to the common law, and the chancellors completely
receded from their interference with the criminal law.'-
The maxim finally developed that equity will not enforce the criminal law.23
Equity will not enjoin the commission of crimes.", However, in the past
few years, the accusation has been made that courts of equity have unwisely
extended their jurisdiction once more so as to include the administration of
the criminal law.15 This can be clearly seen when the Debs'0 case is used
11. See Stuart v. La Salle County, 83 Ill. 341, 345, 25 Am. Rep. 397, 400 (1876).
Since the abolition of the Court of Star Chamber there has been no criminal jurisdiction
of equity. Mack, supra note 10, at 391; ALArn .. , op. cit. supra note 6, at 19.
12. 1 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 405. However, becamuse of the many
disadvantages of the common law procedure and the advantages of the equity pro-
cedure, the court of chancery retained its civil jurisdiction. See note 6, supra.
13. This maxim is attributed to Lord Eldon. It is interesting to note that it was
merely dictum. See Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 413, 36 Eng. Reprints 670, 674
(Ch. 1818).
14. Cope v. District Fair Ass'n, 99 Ill. 489 (1881). The strict rule is that equity
will only protect property rights. There is no basis in principle for equity to confine
its protection to property rights although as a practical matter it is better so restricted.
Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity (1936) 50 HAnv. L. Rxv. 171, 222. Although
it has been stated that equity will not enforce personal rights, there have been many
exceptions to the rule. EATOzr, op. cit. supra note 6, § 6. This rule that equity restricts
itself to protection of proprietary rights only has evolved so that equity will not protect
political rights. Fletcher v. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683 (1894) (to prevent giving
of election notices); United States Voting Machine Co. v. Hobson, 132 Iowa 38, 109
N. W. 458 (1906) (use of voting machines); Winnett v. Adam% 71 Neb. 817, 99 N. W.
6S1 (1904) (to supervise the management of a political party); State C= rel. Crawford
v. Dunbar, 48 Ore. 109, 85 Pac. 337 (1906) (to strike words from a ballot); Fuller v.
McHaney, 192 S. W. 1159 (Te. 1917) (count ballots and declare result of election);
nor will equity enforce religion or morality. Snedaker v. King, 111 Ohio St. 225, 145
N. E. 15 (1924); see Cope v. District Fair, 99 Ill. 489 (1381); Cohen, Positittisn ard the
Limits of Idealism in the Law (1927) 27 CoL. L. REy. 237, 246; but see (1932) 23 J.
Capa. L. 659.
15. That there have been extensions is dear. In re Debs, 158 U. S. $64 (1894); E
parte Wood, 194 Cal. 49, 227 Pac. 908 (1924); People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y.
368, 14 N. E. (2d) 439 (1938); CLARx, EQurrn (1937) § 244. That it has been unwi e,
many writers have alleged. Comment (1924) 73 U. PA. L. Rav. 185; Simpson, supra
note 14, at 247.
16. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1S94). A labor dispute arose between the Pullman
Company and its employees. To adjust the dispute, four officers of the union com-
bined to boycott the cars of the company by preventing the trains from leaving Chicago.
An injunction was issued commanding them and all others combining with them to
desist from their tactics. The injunction was disobeyed and the officers were found in
contempt and sentenced to imprisonment. This case originated on a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus on the ground that the actions of the petitioners in obstructing the
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as a turning point. Prior to that time, American courts of equity sparingly
used the injunction to prevent a crime. Since that case, however, it has been
eagerly seized upon as a precedent,17 and no more phenomenal growth has
been witnessed than that of the injunction. Today it is a common method
of law enforcement,18 having been nurtured both by judicial and legislative
sanction.
Perhaps the theory that doctrines of equity have become rigid, inflexible,
and crystalized 19 must now be qualified in the area of criminal law. Here,
at least, the equitable jurisdiction is not stagnant. It may well be that just
as equity originally arose as an aid to the common law, it is now reawakening
as an aid to the criminal law.20  To what extent will the criminal jurisdiction
of equity develop? At this early stage of its evolution, the limits of its
possible exercise are unknown.
II. THE BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES OF A CRIMINAL EQUITY
Assuming for the moment, that the venerable doctrine that equity will not
take cognizance of violation of the penal law is being effaced, what harm
is there in such an elimination? When Pomeroy 2l conservatively advocates
extending the use of the injunction in criminal matters which are "closely
analogous," he does so cautiously. Indeed, he contends that if this authority
were generally expanded, it would be a clear denial of the right to a trial by
jury. This temperate stand is in striking contrast to the suggestions of other
writers who see naught but benefits in the effectiveness of the injunction. 2 2
Of course, no one can deny that the injunctive process is a speedy2 3 and
United States' mails was a crime and that no injunction could issue to prevent a crime.
The writ of habeas corpus was denied and the court stated that even if a crime were
involved, there was also a public nuisance in the obstruction of a public highway of
commerce. It was declared that restraining nuisances was always in the province of
equity.
17. Simpson, supra note 14, at 228.
18. Id. at 225; (1923) 8 Coau. L. Q. 371.
19. Simpson, supra note 14, 172.
20. Cf. Mack, supra note 10, 389. That the enforcement of the law is lax and that
public officials are corrupt is not enough to move equity to exercise its sweeping powers.
Powers v. Flansburg, 90 Neb. 467, 133 N. W. 844 (1911). Contra: Mayor of Columbus v.
Jacques, 30 Ga. 506 (1860) (influence of defendants would sway jury); Stead v. Fortner,
255 Ill. 468, 99 N. E. 680 (1912). These two cases are against the weight of authority.
Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime (1931) 26 ILL. L. REv. 259, 273. See State v. Craw-
ford, 28 Kan. 726, 733, 42 Am. Rep. 182, 185 (1882) (failure of jury to convict not ground
for equity to interfere).
21. 5 PO roy, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1894.
22. HuSTO r, THE EN-'ORCEMENT or DECREES IN EQUITY (1915) vii; McMurdy, Use of
the Injunction to Destroy Commercialized Prostitution (1929) 19 J. Camu. LAW 513. It
cannot be denied that the injunction is effective when officers of the law neglect to perform
their sworn duty, but that has always been insufficient grounds for equity's interposition.
Heber v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 64 Colo. 352, 172 Pac. 12 (1918). The remedy in
such a case is the ballot box.
23. Chafee, The Progress of the Law (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 388, 398.
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efficient deterrent.2 4 But speed and efficiency are not synonymous with justice.
No defendant charged with a crime desires to go to prison in a hurry if there
is a possibility that a slower trial before a jury of his peers will acquit him.
Deprivation of this jury trial is a deviation from the normal course of
criminal enforcement. Injury to the interests of the general public will be
done unless the procedure of the criminal trial be preserved. By means of
this artful destruction of constitutional guarantees, a definite destruction of
respect for the courts will be experienced.2 The public will not analyze
their opposition20 because of their ignorance of the refinements of jurispru-
dence. But although they do not distinguish between courts of law with
juries and courts of equity without juries, they vaguely experience a feeling
that a procedure contrary to tradition is taking place. The explanation that
the injunction is merely preventive and not punitive2 7 will be inadequate.
They know that it is penal in result, if not in character, because a violation of
the injunction means summary punishment for contempt.2 3
There is still another surprise in store for a hapless defendant. Having
been punished for violating the injunction, the possibility of a conviction for
violation of the penal law remains. The plea of double jeopardy is no defense
to either action because one is criminal and the other is civil.*20  In California,
there is even a possibility of a third punishment. In that state, the wilful
disobedience of an order of a court is a crime all its own.39 Nor is it res
24. Mack, supra note 10, at 400. The efficiency of the injunction lies in the fact that
it is a more personal order than the penal law which is the standing injunction against
crime. Caldwell, supra note 20, at 274. See Legis. (1932) 45 HAnv. L. Plmr,. 1096, 1101.
25. See Caldwell, supra note 20, at 280.
26. Mack, supra note 10, at 402; Legis. (1932) 45 H~nv. L. Rnv. 1096, 11012 1102. Note,
however, that these writers indicate that the opposition to the injunction arose bmcaue
of labor's dislike of the labor injunction. They further contended that the average
American is in favor of the extended use of the injunction in the criminal area. Thi,
writer disagrees, and feels that when the average American is the defendant in equity
on a matter of criminal nature he, too, will find disfavor with the speedy and efficient
injunction.
Mack at 403 indicaies that the public welcomes the extended use of the injunction
especially in cases of violations of the antitrust law because the offenders were too in-
fluential for the criminal courts. But he cautions with some degree of forenight that this
jurisdiction may lead to abuse. This misuse of power is somewhat evident today in
the present policy of the U. S. Department of Justice. The threat of the remedy of
injunction plus an added amount of publicity adverse to the defendant finally is expcted
to result in a consent decree. It is possible for this decree to contain proviions beyond
those obtainable in the ordinary suit in equity. See Arnold, Use of Pre.Tet Artlitrust
Procedure (1933) 47 YALE L. J. 1294, 1300 where he admits the policy of the Department
is the use of the injunction, publicity, and consent decrees.
27. See Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa 488, 452, 22 N. IV. 641, 644 (1835).
28. Comment (1930) 2S MIcH. L. Rnv. 440, 442.
29. People ex rel. Lemon v. Elmore, 225 App. Div. 369, 233 N. Y. Supp. 40 (2d
Dep't 1929) ; Ex jarte Allison, 99 Tex. 455, 90 S. W. 370 (1906) ; see In re Debs, 153 U. S.
564, 599 (1894). Contra: Ex parte Morris, 194 Cal. 63, 227 Pac. 914 (1924).
30. See (1924) 13 CA=n. L. Rm'. 63, 67.
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adjudicata that the defendant has already been acquitted on a criminal charge
of maintaining a nuisance.3 1 The theory of these holdings is that the purpose
of the equity trial is prevention and not punishment. However, many of
the statutes upheld are in obvious contradiction of this explanation. They
provide that if the existence of a nuisance has been proved, equity has no
alternative but to grant the injunction even though the nuisance no longer
exists. There is no obligation to prove that the nuisance is likely to recur. 2
It is obvious that the abateiment of an already abated nuisance is merely a
thinly disguised delegation of criminal jurisdiction to equity. The impression
of having been tricked will be justifiable. It is then but a short step to the
shattering of complete faith in the expected true administration of justice.
The breakdown of this requirement for a jury trial in criminal matters 3
is being accomplished in two ways: (1) by legislation which widens the area
of equitable jurisdiction and transfers the control of criminal matters to
the equity courts; and (2) by the generous extension of the equitable prin-
ciple that a court of equity will act where the remedies at law are inadequate.34
The enlargement by legislation will be later considered.3, Distortion of the
equity requirement of an inadequate remedy at law has been urged by district
attorneys. The theory developed in cases where defendants were acquitted
every time they were indicted. 30 This difficulty to convict is well illustrated
in the unsuccessful prosecutions of persons practising a profession without a
license; following each acquittal the defendant at once commits the alleged
crime again and again. But it is submitted that it is fallacious to argue
that the legal remedy is inadequate because juries refuse to convict. The jury
was purposely created so that the law would be tempered with the human
element 3 7  This was evident during the prohibition era. Juries were loathe
to convict because of lack of sympathy for the statute creating the crime.38
31. Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 630 (1926).
32. See Comment (1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 269, 271.
33. Jury trials are guaranteed in criminal cases. U. S. CONST. Amendment VI (1791);
N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 2 (1938); United States v. Cunningham, 37 F. (2d) 349 (D. Neb.
1929).
34. See note 7, supra.
35. See p. 247, infra.
36. State ex rel. La Prade v. Smith, 43 Ariz. 131, 29 P. (2d) 718 (1934); State v.
Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 88 Neb. 669, 130 N. W. 295 (1911). Contra: People ex rel.
Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368, 382, 14 N. E. 439, 445 (1938).
37. See Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rav. 582-84.
The refusal of juries to convict today is not the counterpart of the refusal of judges
to convict during the reign of Richard II. See p. 238, supra. The juries are performing
their duty honestly whereas the judges were shirking their duty corruptly. Cf. CLA1x,
op. cit. supra note 6, § 244 where he says history is repeating itself. But see note 20,
supra. Lax enforcement will not move equity to grant relief.
38. (1931) The World Almanac, p. 37. Report by the Assistant Attorney General on
liquor enforcement. Trials by jury resulted in 61% acquittals in the Eastern District of
New York, and in the Southern District of New York the acquittals were 53%. This
report covered the year ending June 1930 and it is stated that this ratio remained constant.
However, note that only about 10% of all the cases were even submitted to juries. Cf.
[Vol. 8
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Besides any number of other factors may contribute to an acquittal. The
jurors may not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, or the district attorney
may not have properly prepared his case.
Once adopt a liberal policy of granting injunctions in aid of the criminal
law and the safeguards of the ordinary rules of criminal procedure are evaded
by merely changing the tribunal for determining guilt.39 In any criminal
prosecution, following the indictment, there is a jury trial; guilt must be
shown beyond a reasonable doubt; and there is a presumption that the de-
fendant is innocent until proven guilty.40 Not so under the equity procedure.
No longer is it necessary to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt, but only by a preponderance of the evidence." This is
graphically illustrated by considering the simple crime of lending money at
usurious rates of interest.42  If this crime is made the basis of injunctive
proceedings the picture is materially altered. There is no jury;43 no longer
is there a presumption of innocence; no longer need the evidence be so
overwhelming as to destroy all reasonable doubt. Mere preponderance suffices.
A still further development of the extension into criminal matters occurs after
the injunction has been disobeyed. The defendant is now charged with con-
tempt. A one-man court sits in judgment. There is no jury here and all
the other safeguards of the criminal trial heretofore mentioned are missing.
4
State v. Jones, 114 Wash. 144, 194 Pac. 585 (1921) where the court held that although
the defendant had a glass of liquor in his hand, he did not have it in his possession.
This is an indication that the attitude of judges towards the enforcement of the liquor
laws was similar to the antipathy of jurors prevalent at the time.
39. FRas.Nxr~u m AD GREEE, THE LABOR LvNJUNcriO. (1930) 107.
40. People v. Sutherland, 252 N. Y. 86, 168 N. E. 838 (1929); Royals v. Common-
wealth, 144 Va. 630, 131 S. E. 204 (1926).
41. Courts of equity are courts of civil law and the rules of evidence of these civil
courts is observed. 2 SToRy, op. cit. supra note 1, 854; 5 WmotORE, EvmFxcn (2d ed.
1923) § 249S; cf. Comment (1924) 72 U. PA. L. REv. 283, 286 where he suggests that
in spite of the fact that a preponderance of evidence suffices, no judge who is human
would be satisfied until all reasonable doubt is dispelled.
42. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1938) § 2400; State ex rel. Smith v. McMahon, 128 Kan. 772,
280 Pac. 906 (1929). This is the first case to attempt enforcement of the usury law
by an injunction. Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 590.
43. Note that in the granting of the labor injunction a jury trial is now provided for.
(1938) 8 BY=Nr. L. Rnv. 100, 106.
44. See Comment (1930) 28 lcH. L. Ray. 440, 442. It has been suggested that the
defect of a jury trial be corrected at this point by requiring juries in cases of contempt.
This suggestion is not practicable. To permit the uncertainties of a jury trial to prevail
where formerly punishment for contempt was summary would undermine the entire
strength of the equity court. The remedy lies not in the enforcement of the injunction
but in the jurisdiction to issue them. Black, supra note 10, at 402. Unless checled, the
momentum of this expansion may carry it along to unbelievable lengths. In California
it seems the limit has been reached. Comment (1925) 73 U. PA. L. RLA. 185. This
result was obtained by the use of an "omnibus!' injunction. The injunction merely
recited the penal statute in the form of a restraining order and it was directed to un-
named defendants. Ex parte Wood, 194 Cal. 49, 227 Pac. 903, 911 (1924). A similar device
1939]
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III. NUISANCES
Although many dangers have been indicated in the use of the equitable
process, there are instances of the use of the powers of equity which are
approved by tradition and practicability. That equity will act to restrain
nuisances is well known.45 This is true even though the injunction will inci-
dentally restrain the commission of a crime.46  The rule has evolved that it
is no defense to a bill to enjoin a nuisance whether public or private47 to
show that it is also a crime and that the criminality of the deed will not
per se oust equity of jurisdiction.48
A public nuisance has been defined as any place where a public statute is
"openly, publicly, repeatedly, continuously, persistently," and intentionally
violated.49 This definition is indicative of the general looseness of language
associated with this term." However, such a result is almost inevitable be-
cause the term is so comprehensive and its content so heterogeneous. A more
exact definition and one limited to cases in which it is proper for equity to
act is anything causing material inconvenience or serious annoyance to the
public as a whole. 5 ' The best example of the classical public nuisance Is the
maintenance of saloons and gambling-houses.
The right of action to restrain the commission of a public nuisance62 belongs
to the government. There is only one distinction between this cause of action
and one to restrain a private nuisance. No property right in the government
need be shown. 3 It is sufficient that there is the duty to protect the property
rights of all its citizens.
New York, however, insisted for a long time that there be a property right
even when the suit was instituted by the state. In Attorney-General v. Utica
was used in Michigan. There "John Doe" and "Richard Roe" were enjoined from
violating the laws of the state of Michigan. Comment (1930) 28 Micn. L. Rzv. 440,
443 (unreported case).
45. 1 PomrmEoY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 24.
46. 5 Pommoy, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1941.
47. Private nuisance: People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N. E. 59 (1892);
Hamilton v. Whitridge, 11 Md. 128 (1857). Public nuisance: People v. Truckee Lumber
Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 Pac. 374 (1897); State v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 726, 42 Am. Dec. 182
(1882).
48. See People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368, 14 N. E. (2d) 439, 444 (1938).
49. State v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 726, 733, 42 Am. Rep. 182, 189 (1882); cl. the
definition in N. Y. Pzux, LAW (1909) § 1530.
50. Caldwell, supra note 20, at 267. "The category of public nuisance includes such
an infinite variety of seemingly unrelated situations that it is impossible to frame any
definition which would be of material assistance in determining what is and what Is not
a public nuisance in particular cases." RESTATEmENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1938) 55.
51. State v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S. C. 181, 63 S. E. 884, 889 (1909);
see 4 BL. CoMM. 167.
52. Chafee finds the power of the chancellor to restrain public nuisances In the fact
that he is the representative of the sovereign who is the guardian of the public welfare.
Chafee, supra note 23, at 395.
53. State v. Lindsay, 85 Kan. 79, 116 Pac. 207 (1911).
[Vol. 8
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Insurance Co. 4 the court refused to enjoin unauthorized banking operations.
The court stated by way of dictum that assuming that this was a public
nuisance, no injunction would issue because there was no interference with
any property rights of the state or the public. Relying on this dic-um
relief was denied unless a property right could be found needing protection0 0
But, there was not universal acceptance of the New York opinion,rT and even
those states which adopted the New York viewpoint later abandoned it.P3 The
courts began to recognize that health and morals were just as important as
property rights. But it was not until 1938 that New York judicially recog-
nized this truism. In the case of People ex rel. Bennett, Att'y-Gan. v. Laman3
the court restrained a chiropractor from the unlicensed practise of medicine.
It was dearly stated that the basis of the decision was the power of courts
of equity to restrain acts which are detrimental to the public health. Thus
the annoying and illogical requirement 0 that a property right must be involved
was deleted from the public nuisance class of cases. It must be observed,
however, that neither the mere unlicensed practise of medicine,0 ' nor the
54. 2 Johns. 371 (N. Y. 1817).
55. It is interesting to note that the subject of criminal jurisdiction of equity is
easily influenced by dicta. It is the dictum of Lord Eldon in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans.
402, 413, 36 Eng. Reprints 670, 674 (Ch. 1813) which is the keystone of this subject,
generally.
56. See Caldwell, supra note 20, at 264; (193S) 8 BxIy. L. Rzv. 100, 101. Compare
State v. Ohio Oil Co., 150 Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 809 (1893) with State v. Schwei"cardt, 109
Mo. 496, 19 S. W. 47 (1892).
There is an early English case in which an injunction was granted on unusual facts.
The plaintiff was the Emperor of Austria. He successfully enjoined the defendants in
the English Court of Chancery from bringing spurious paper money from England into
Austria. The court side-stepped the criminal aspect of the case by declaring it was pre-
venting injury to property. Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De G., F. & J. 217, 45 Eng.
Reprints 861 (1861).
57. State v. Mobile, 5 Porter 279, 30 Am. Dec. 564 (Ala. 1837); Attorney-General v.
R. R., 35 Wis. 425, 537 (1874).
5S. Compare State v. Schweckardt, 109 Mo. 496, 19 S. W. 47 (1892) with State v.
Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S. W. 1073 (1907).
59. 277 N. Y. 368, 14 N. E. (2d) 439 (1938).
60. Simpson, supra note 14, at 222. Whether this need for a property right as stated
in the Utica Ins. Co. case had to be satisfied in New York was in doubt until the
Laman case finally erased it. It will be recalled that in the Utica Ins. Co. case it was
merely dictum. Then Health Dep't v. Purdon, 99 N. Y. 237, 2 N. E. 637 (1835) stated
in a dictum that an injunction would issue to protect the health of the community
even though there were no property rights involved. However, the court cited the
Utica Ins. Co. case favorably. These developments can well be called erratic. Cf.
Att'y-Gen'l v. R. R., 35 Wis. 425, 549 (1874). A true indication of this unzettled state
of the law is evident from the report of the Appellate Division in the Laman case. The
injunction was denied on the authority of the Utica Ins. Co. case which it declared had
never been questioned. 250 App. Div. 660, 295 N. Y. Supp. 228 (2d Dep't 1937). See
(1938) 24 Copu. L. Q. 118.
61. People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368, 371, 14 N. E. (2d) 439, 442
(1938). Contra: Kentucky State B3d. v. Payne, 213 Ky. 332, 281 S. W. 183 (1926).
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mere violation of any other penal statute, 2 spells out a nuisance per se. The
fact of the public nuisance must be proved.68
Kansas has gone further and has even abolished the necessity of proving
the fact of a public nuisance. This is evidenced by the case of State ex rel.
Smith v. McMahon64 where the lending of money at usurious rates of interest
was restrained . 5  When an injunction issues in a case such as this, it seems
that a cause of action is made out by merely alleging the successive violations
of the criminal law. The weight of authority has always been against this
proposition. 60  It is submitted that this case is an unwarranted extension of
the proposition of the Debs67 case that equity has jurisdiction to protect the
"public welfare."
City of New Orleans v. Liberty Shop 8 is another example of the extension
of equity jurisdiction by way of extending the scope of public nuisances. In
that case, an injunction was granted to prevent the operation of a retail busi-
ness in a residential district in violation of a municipal zoning ordinance. The
court found that this amounted to a nuisance69 to a sufficiently large number
of the public and therefore restrained it.
Equity will also grant an injunction to restrain the commission of a private
nuisance. A private nuisance is spelled out whenever a person's occupation
and enjoyment of his property are rendered injurious to his health whether
because of odors, noises, or because of other injurious or seriously disturbing
features.70 It is most essential for the plaintiff in order to come within the
confines of this definition, to show a substantial interference with the enjoy-
ment of his property.7' This requirement is particularly important and must
62. Caldwell, supra note 20, at 270.
63. Strangely and erroneously it seems that where a person practices law without a
license, there is no public nuisance. There is, however, a right of action in the members
of the bar to abate a private nuisance. Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n,
38 Ohio 265, 176 N. E. 577 (1931). However, N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT (1935) § 1221b
authorizes a suit by the attorney-general to restrain the illegal practise of law. This
section has not been construed.
64. 128 Kan. 772, 280 Pac. 906 (1929). Contra: People ex rel. Stephens v. Seccombe,
103 Cal. App. 306, 284 Pac. 725 (1930).
65. Extending the injunction to usury cases has been described as "a spurious ex-
pansion of the public nuisance concept." Simpson, supra note 14, at 228. See note
42, supra.
66. People v. Vandewater, 250 N. Y. 83, 164 N. E. 864 (1928).
67. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 584, 586 (1895).
68. 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798 (1924).
69. It has also been held to be a private nuisance. Holzbauer v. Ritter, 184 Wis.
35, 198 N. W. 852 (1924). Contra: Whiteridge v. Calestock, 100 Misc. 367, 165 N. Y.
Supp. 640 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
70. Cranford v. Tyrrell, 128 N. Y. 341, 28 N. E. 514 (1891).
71. Property right involved; injunction granted: Jones v. Oemler, 110 Ga. 202, 35
S. E. 375 (1900) (criminal trespass on oyster beds); Barrett v. Mt. Greenwood Ass'n,
159 Il. 385, 42 N. E. 891 (1896) (criminal pollution of stream). No property right;
injunction denied: Cope v. District Fair, 99 Ill. 489, 39 Am. Rep. 30 (1881) (gambling)
Ocean City Ass'n v. Schurch, 57 N. J. Eq. 268, 41 AtI. 914 (1898) (Sunday bathing)
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be observed where the same act constitutes both a private and a public
nuisance such as the operation of a bawdy-house in dose proximity with the
plaintiff's property. He must show that he suffers damage different from the
rest of the public.72  It has been clearly decided that the mere fact that a
statute has been violated does not spell out a nuisance per se.73 The act com-
plained of must be an actual nuisance apart from the fact that it is a vio-
lation of the penal law. Thus a licensed bus driver may not enjoin his
competitor from operating a bus without a license and in violation of a
municipal ordinance.74 However, the courts of equity have not been so strict
in cases involving unlicensed professional men. They argue that the indi-
vidual's right to practice a profession is either a property right 75 or a franchise70
which is being violated by unlicensed practitioners.77
IV. STATUTORY ENLARGEMENTS
There have been numerous enlargements of the powers of equity by statute
in the federal field. Many injunctions have been granted under the Sherman
Antitrust Act.78  These cases involved the prevention of concerted action to
injure property of members of the public so as to amount to a public nuisance. 0
It was after the passage of this Act that the famous Debs80 case was decided.
There the officials of a union, in enforcing a boycott of the Pullman Car
Company conspired to interfere with trains carrying mail and interstate freight.
The court granted the injunction and found there was a technical property
Cf. Mack, supra note 10, at 397 where he describes the case of Jones v. Oemler, supra
as a careless disregard of the traditional limits of equity jurisdiction. But sea S
Poasnoy, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 1891 where he cites the case as the usual instance
of the application of the principle.
72. O'Brien v. Harris, 105 Ga. 732, 31 S. E. 745 (1898); Cranford v. Tyrrell, 128 N. Y.
341 (1891). 5 Poamo-z, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1956 eahausts the possible types of cases.
73. Waupun v. Moore, 34 Wis. 450, 17 Am. Rep. 446 (1874).
74. Healy v. Sidone, 127 At. 520 (N. J. Ch. 1923); San Antonio v. Schutte, 246
S. W. 413 (Tex. 1922). Contra: New York, N. H., & H. R.R. v. Deister, 253 Mass. 178,
148 N. E. 590 (1925) (it was held to be a nuisance).
75. It is difficult to distinguish this property right from that of operating a bus.
76. Matter of Co-Operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910). Where
the plaintiff has been given an exclusive franchise, he may enjoin others from competing.
California State Telegraph Co. v. Alta Telegraph Co., 22 Cal. 398 (1863); Rar. & Del.
Bay R.R. v. Del. & Rar. Canal, 18 N. J. Eq. 546 (1867).
77. Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S. C. 39, 198 S. E. 419 (1938). Suits of this nature are
representative actions. If they were not, it is difficult to see how one member of a
profession could claim his property is substantially damaged. It is, however, posible
for that class of professional men to show that their franchise is violated. Comment
(1937) 35 MlicH. L. REv. 497. Prior to 1931 attorneys didn't avail themselves of this
remedy. See Comment (1938) 11 So. CAiar. L. REV. 476 covering the various classes of
professional men.
78. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1926).
79. United States v. Elliot, 62 Fed. 801 (E. D. Mo. 1894); United States v. Agler,
62 Fed. 824 (D. Ind. 1894).
80. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
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right of the federal government in the mails which was being molested. Be-
sides finding a property right, the court held that the obstruction of a national
way of commerce was a public nuisance.8 '
One of the most well known of federal statutory extensions of equity into
the criminal zone is the late unlamented Prohibition Act.82 There were two
injunctions possible. The padlock injunction was one. It provided that if
a tenant trafficks in liquor, the landlord would lose the right to use those
premises for one year because it was a nuisance. 8  This procedure bad been
held constitutional ever since the case of Mugler v. Kansas.8 4 The other in-
junction authorized was directed against a person engaged in bootlegging
activities. The constitutionality of this section is in dispute even at this late
date.8 5
There have been statutory extensions by the state legislatures" too. An
unsuccessful and most unusual attempt to enjoin a crime was exposed in the
case of State ex rel. Stewart v. District Court.87  Instead of enlarging the
power of the court of equity, the legislature granted to a criminal court the
authority to enjoin violations of the state liquor law. This was declared un-
constitutional because injunctions are the weapons peculiar to courts of equity
and may not be assigned to criminal tribunals. No other legislature has ever
attempted this before or since.
It has been stated that the policy in New York is to extend the remedy
of injunction and not to restrict it.88 Today injunctions may be had in this
state to restrain violations of the rules regulating milk control,89 and public
markets,90 zoning laws,0 ' and certain nuisances.9 2
81. Note, however, that generally strikes, boycotts, and other interferences with lawful
business would be private nuisances. Gompers v. Buck Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911);
Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83 N. E. 928 (1908).
82. 41 STAT. 314 (1919), 23 U. S. C. §§ 34, 35 (1926).
83. Grosfield v. United States, 276 U. S. 494 (1928); United States v. Relsenweber,
288 Fed. 520 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); United States v. Boynton, 297 Fed. 261 (E. D. Mich.
1924).
84. 123 U. S. 623 (1887).
85. Simpson, supra note 14, at 227. Compare United States v. Lockbardt, 33 F.
(2d) 597 (D. Neb. 1929) with United States v. Cunningham, 37 F. (2d) 349 (D. Neb.
1929); (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1159. See (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REV. 440, 442 where the
writer indicates that the Supreme Court of the United States never passed on the validity
of the injunction against the person. The case of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887)
which is cited as authority on the constitutionality of this injunction is not in point.
That injunction was not directed against a person but against specific property.
86. The first of these was in Iowa in 1884. Comment (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv.
440, 441. The fact that the concept of public nuisance is so vague and indefinite Is an
aid to statutory enlargement.
87. 77 Mont. 361, 251 Pac. 137 (1926).
88. See People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368, 382, 14 N. E. (2d) 439,
445 (1938).
89. N. Y. AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAW (1938) § 258-e.
90. Id. § 270-c.
91. N. Y. VILLAGE LAW (1934) § 179-c.
92. N. Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (1927) §§ 343a-e.
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This liberal attitude of legislatures to enlarge the remedy of injunction to
the field of criminal law is clearly traceable back to the case of Lttleton v.
Fritz,93 and others similar to it at that time.94  Under the statutes involved,
the right of action to restrain the public nuisance of criminally selling liquor
was granted to any individual member of the public. There was no need
for him to allege that he suffered damages different from the rest of the
public.95 The court points out that there was no deprivation of the right
to a trial by jury because in the field of nuisances there never was that
right. 96 Equity always had the power to xestrain this act because it con-
stituted a public nuisance. The statute merely designates the person who may
bring the action. It must, however, be observed that the legislature cannot
declare every act a nuisance.97  It is obvious that if the legislature is not
limited to acts which in fact are nuisances, it could transfer jurisdiction over
all crimes to the courts of equity by the simple expedient of labelling them
nuisances. On the other hand the legislature may validly extend the common
boundaries to situations resembling the classical common law nuisances by
balancing interests to determine whether a nuisance exists.9 3 Although the
legislature may differ with the courts on whether a nuisance exists in the
border line cases, yet it is not unusual for the courts to differ among them-
selves. These statutes usually apply to such borderline cases and have been
upheld as a valid extension of equity's jurisdiction.P
V. LIBEL
There is one crime worthy of particular note, libel300 It is neither a public
nor a private nuisance, but in certain instances an injunction will issue to
restrain future publication. The evolution of the use of this injunction dates
back to 1875. Before that date no court of equity would grant an injunction
to restrain a threatened libel.101 Although the power had been conferred upon
the chancery courts by statute passed in 1854, it was not until 1875 that
the power was exercised.10 2  In order for this extraordinary remedy to be
93. 65 IowA 488, 22 N. W. 641 (1885).
94. Kansas v. Ziebold, 123 U. S. 623, 671 (1887); Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550,
22 N. E. 55 (1889); Ex Parte Allison, 90 S. W. 492 (Tex. 1905).
95. It will be recalled that a private citizen had only the right to restrain a public
nuisance when it also was a private nuisance as to him. See p. 247, spra.
96. Equity had jurisdiction over nuisances before the bill of rights was adopted. That
jurisdiction was not meant to be denied equity by the constitutions. (1923) 3 Cow.
L. Q. 371, 372.
97. State v. Saunders, 66 N. H. 39, 25 Ati. 588 (18S9); Richmond v. Caruthers, 103
Va. 774, 50 S. E. 265 (1905).
98. Chafee, supra note 23, at 399.
99. See note 94, supra. Contra: Hedden v. Hand, 90 N. J. Eq. 533, 107 A. 235
(1919). Chafee criticizes this court as having too narrow a viewpoint. Chafee, supra
note 23, at 399.
100. N. Y. P~xAL LAW (1938) § 1340.
101. NALrrmr.s', op. dt. sup ra note 6, at 19.
102. Ibid.
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granted a property right had to be shown. This requirement was satisfied
when the plaintiff alleged his business was being defamed. 0 3 The American
courts of equity have refused to be so liberal with the injunction. It is
generally settled that even where a property right is involved, the sacredness
of the theory of free speech rears itself up to prevent equity from acting in
advance of publication.10 4 The New York Court of Appeals is in accord
with this rule.10 5  However, the lower courts in New York have not followed
this authority.10 6 They relaxed the rule so that a competitor would be re-
strained from defaming another's product. 07  But recently an Appellate
Division case'0 8 refused to grant an injunction restraining a future libel and
relied on the authority as stated in the highest court in New York. It is
submitted that the strict rule of no injunction for libel is still the New York
law, at least until the Court of Appeals definitely declares otherwise.
VI. CONCLUSION
Looking back over the years since In re Debs, the dominant note to be
observed is the expansion of the field of equity jurisdiction over criminal
matters. This expansion is accounted for by the enlarged concept of the
nebulous category called nuisance principally by means of statutory changes.
Such enlargement was, however, to be expected. Our rapidly changing world
encountering multitudes of new problems could not be restricted to its
original limits. Nor is it logical to expect that the category of nuisances
should be limited to the concept of earlier times.'0 9
No violence has been done to the old principles. It is still the general rule
that equity will not enforce the criminal law; and it is still the exception
that if equity can assume jurisdiction on other grounds, the criminality 01
103. 5. PomaOY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1895. Thorley's Cattle-Food Co. v. Massain,
14 Ch. D. 763 (1880).
104. 5 PoimRoy, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1895. It seems that a further ground would
be an adequate remedy at law. Accord: Finnish Temperance Soc. v. Raivaaja Pub. Co.,
219 Mass. 28, 106 N. E. 561 (1914) ; De Wick v. Dobson, 18 App. Div. 399, 46 N. Y. Supp.
390 (2d Dep't 1897). Contra: Beck v. Ry. Teamsters' Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W.
13 (1898).
105. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24 (N. Y. 1839); Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields,
171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902); cf. Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co.,
245 Mass. 262, 139 N. E. 655 (1923). In that case the Massachusetts court circum-
vented the hard and fast rule by a change in the manner of pleading. The plaintiff
merely alleges there is continuing injury to property without mentioning the defamation.
106. Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N. Y. Supp. 692 (4th Dep't
1928); Old Investors' Corp. v. Jenkins, 133 Misc. 213, 232 N. Y. Supp. 245 (Sup. Ct.
1928); Samson United Corp. v. Dover Mfg. Co., 139 Misc. 312, 248 N. Y. Supp. 325
(Sup. Ct. 1931); Downes v. Culbertson, 153 Misc. 14, 275 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
107. See (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 1291.
108. Singer v. Romerrick, 255 App. Div. 715, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 607 (2d Dep't 1938).
Note that this case is partially distinguishable from the liberal cases in note 106, suspra.
Those suits were between competitors. In this case, the defamation was uttered by a
dissatisfied vendee.
109. Simpson, supra note 14, at 226.
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the act will not oust it. The two main divisions under which equity assumes
jurisdiction are public and private nuisances. To enjoin a private nuisance,
the individual plaintiff must show some property right of his which is en-
dangered. The extension of this point of view was created by statutes which
gave the individuals a right of action, without showing any property right as
long as the act was in fact a public nuisance. In all cases of public nuisance,
the state has a right of action by showing that a property right of a great
many individuals is involved. This was extended so that detriments to
public health will be protected, without the need of proving a property right.
Recent statutory extensions are found, inter alia, in the Sherman Antitrust
Act, the late Volstead Act, the defunct National Recovery Act,110 the
Securities and Exchange Act,"' and the National Labor Relations Act.1 -2 In
the state field there are many extensions. A New York case" 3 enumerates
more than a dozen new injunctions authorized, and concludes that the policy
is to extend the injunctive remedy." 4  Finally, in cases of libel, it seems as
though the injunction will be withheld and the plaintiff will be relegated to
his action for damages.
It is obvious that wherever a traditional crime is proved, such as robbery,
no injunction will issue. On the other hand, equity ought to act where the
crime is too complicated for a jury, e.g., antitrust violations." 3 There the
request for a jury to determine facts that are too complicated for them to
understand is an inconsistency. And wherever there is no likelihood that the
evidence is disputed, no jury can be said to be necessary." 0  Such a case
is the violation of building and zoning laws.
Because of the growing complexity of our government, extensions further
than these can be expected."17  But they are unwise if they go too far be-
yond reasonable limits. Too often, the extension occurs when the chancellor
neglects to remember that the penal law is an efficient standing injunction
against crime." 8  When the prosecutors wield it properly, there is no need
for recourse to equity.
110. 48 STAT. 195, 15 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. (1934).
111. 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq. (1934) amended 49 ST,x. 1921; IS
U. S. C. A. § 78u(e) (Supp. 1936).
112. 49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1935).
113. See People ex reL. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368, 382, 14 N. E. (2d) 439,
445 (1938).
114. For statutes generally in the United States see Legis. (1932) 45 HAV. L. PM,. 1096.
115. Perhaps the line of demarcation is that crimes of a continuing nature, such as
antitrust violations, more nearly resemble the common law nuisances and so ought to be
enjoined. But an isolated robbery or a scheme of robberies are so unlike the accepted
notions of nuisances that no injunction will issue.
116. Simpson, supra note 14, at 227.
117. Id. at 224.
118. Wood Mowing & Reaping Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 196, 186 N. Y. Supp.
95, 102 (Sup. CL 1921). But see Caldwell, supra note 20, at 274. He points out, not
without merit, that a command of a court addressed to a particular defendant is more
effective than a statute addressed to all the residents of a state.
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Unless tests are set up to prevent a gradual elimination of the right to
a jury in criminal cases, other civil liberties will be destroyed in its wake. To
sacrifice juries for the sake of speed and efficiency sayors of the ideology
of totalitarianism. Fortunately the American system of jurisprudence tends
to the opposite course.
Two tests can be set up. First, courts of equity should not grant injunc-
tions to restrain acts that are wrongful only in that they are forbidden by
the penal law. Second, the courts of equity should refuse every attempt by
the legislature to grant such power to it unless, after all the interests involved
have been balanced, it can reasonably be said that a nuisance does exist. 110
It is submitted that any hiatus in the penal law ought to be corrected by
the legislature in the procedure of the criminal courts and not by grants of
power to courts of equity. The legislature is to be reminded that courts can-
not violate the law in order to prevent the violation of the law.
119. The theory of the court would be that the grant is unconstitutional. There
would be a denial of the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases. 5 Pomimoy, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 1894.
